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Abstract
The Blockchain social movement not only opposed
the economic system in the post-2009 financial crisis
years, it provided a tangible technological alternative,
built in computer code and using Open Source (OS)
principles.
The social movement mobilized using familiar OS
structures and activities as action repertoires. Although
this openness encouraged mobilization, this ran the risk
of losing control, as individuals used the OS code for
their own purposes, outside the scope of the social
movement.
The use of OS action repertoires provided ways to
coordinate, vent and build consensus. Further, the
resulting dissent, when it occurred made the movement
more relevant by extending the movement and
mobilizing individuals in complementary areas, driven
by economic incentives. The OS repertoire of open
entrepreneurship also facilitated mobilization, making
the movement more influential.

1. Introduction
The emergence of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin
occurred at a time when the financial system of the day
was facing a crisis of trust: Existing elites and
institutions had been criticized for taking advantage of
ordinary individuals (often called the 99%), in order to
make money for the 1%, including through bail-outs [1].
Crucially, many pointed to a systemic failure in the
financial system as enabling this problematic behavior,
namely centralization e.g. [2]. The decentralized Open
Source (OS) technology behind Bitcoin, the Blockchain,
was framed as providing a technical alternative “as a
system for electronic transactions without relying on
[third party] trust” [3]. In so doing, it 1) offered an OS
technology as an alternative to existing ways of
conducting transactions, which 2) allowed for more
transparency in how and when new money was created,
and 3) built upon OS repertoires when it came to both
organizing and governance [4]. This digitally mediated
form of trust emerged at the same time as other antiURI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/71390
978-0-9981331-4-0
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establishment economic social movements like Occupy
Wall Street [5], and other digital and decentralized
alternatives in finance, like crowdfunding [6], [7] and
peer-to-peer loans [8].
Although many activists are skeptical of new
technologies [9], technologies can be both a tool in a
social movement, for instance when activists rally
behind a cancer treatment technology [10], or the
outcome of activism, as in the case of animal rights
activism leading to technological alternatives to animal
testing [11]. That a technology might embody the
processes through which activism occurs, rather than as
a tool or an outcome of activism is perhaps not
surprising, given advances in understanding the
materiality of the digital in organizing [12], [13].
Mobilization with the aim of reaching a critical
mass is a common goal for social movements. In this
case, for Blockchain technologies to become an
alternative to this one element of the financial system
would require not just the technology, but adoption by a
critical mass. This would frame the technology as a
viable alternative to the status quo and legitimize the
cause [14], while also attracting resources that would
support activism [15]. Activists typically mobilize
through organizational and protest structures, known as
action repertoires [16].
Social movements (SMs), or “networks of informal
interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups
and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural
conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities”
[17, p. 1] often have a champion who guides the
movement [18], harnesses and generates knowledge
[19], and attracts other resources [15]. However, an OS
movement does not necessarily have a single champion.
Instead, it relies on openness to attract resources and
knowledge [20]. However, this approach does not
prevent resources and knowledge from leaving the
community or being used for unsanctioned ends [21].
This has been highlighted as a paradox: openness
encourages adoption, use and innovation through re-use
and repurposing, encouraging an OS project (and thus a
social movement) to grow. However, this may come at
the expense of control and the ability to set collectivelevel goals [22].
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That this openness is double-edged makes its
implications for the social movement unclear. On the
one hand, individuals in an OS social movement might
pursue similar goals, albeit in different ways and with
different incentives. On the other hand, this openness
may lead to fragmentation. Thus, understanding how OS
social movement repertoires are employed, and for what
ends, is critical to understanding how these repertoires
affect the social movement. We thus ask the question:
How does the use of open source repertoires to
mobilize affect the Blockchain social movement?
This paper builds on literatures around OS
communities, e.g. [20], [22], [23], social movement
repertoires [18], [24], and the dynamics around a social
movement mediated by a technology [10], [11]. More
specifically, it considers the effect of mobilization
through OS repertoires on 1) the social movement of
Blockchain’s core aims, namely to highlight the flaws
of the existing economic system and present a viable
alternative, and 2) what happens when a technology
mediates a social movement.
To answer this question, we undertook a mixed
methods study of the social movement, based on forum
data spanning a 6-year period, triangulated against other
sources. In what follows, we discuss how OS features
provide a familiar tactical repertoire, and how they are
used to mobilize in the name of the Blockchain social
movement. We then turn to analyzing the case of the
Blockchain social movement.

2. The OS social movement of Blockchain
Social movements typically frame a crisis like
2008/2009 financial crisis the as a political opportunity
[5], [25]. This particular crisis was characterized as, at
best, an unfortunate accident in a complex system [26],
or at worst a failure of market economics [27], in a

system dominated by elites [2]. At its core, it exposed
the failings in which the formerly legitimate financial
system operated. Blockchain proponents argued not just
that social system had failed, but that there was a
problem with their material systems, namely the fact
that they were 1) centralized, and thus 2) controlled by
elites with vested interests. It then offered an alternative
in the form of a new technology.
Extant research has pointed to how digital
technologies have transformed social movements in one
of two ways: either by 1) affecting the process of
activism through the use of digital tools, most notably
social media, or 2) prompting new technologies,
increasingly digital, as a result of activism. These two
areas of research are summarized in Table 1.

2.1. OS, Digital Technologies and Social
Movements
The Blockchain social movement, in a novel turn of
events, chose to oppose the economic system by not just
protesting against it as others had done e.g. [28], but by
providing an (open source) alternative to how the
economic system might run. In the process it made use
of a repertoire of familiar narratives and actions to
promote the technology, with an emphasis on
mobilization.
Gathering a mass following and aligning
individuals with the social movement’s aims is known
as mobilization. Mobilization is pursued for three
reasons; first, for the movement’s narratives and actions
to be perceived as influential and relevant [29], [30],
second to mobilize resources [31], and third to
overcome the impasse where there is no individual
incentive to act (or even incentives for individual
members of the collective to ‘free ride’[32]), known as
collective action.

Table 1: The impact of digital technologies on social movement processes and outcomes
Description

Digital technologies
present new ways of
mobilising and
acting

Technological
solutions as a result
of social movements

Case
New forms of collective engagement during the Gulf of
Mexico oil spill
Online activism at 2009 G20 London Summit during the
global (2009) financial crisis
Bypassing gatekeepers in the Tahrir Square uprising
Informal learning during #OccupyWallStreet
Digital empowerment during protests against a rare earth
refinery plant
Digital action repertoires at Amnesty International
Technological alternatives to animal testing
Digital Education through MOOCs
Creation of new (technological) knowledge
Democratisation of entrepreneurial finance through
crowdfunding

Example Reference
e.g. Vaast et al. 2017
e.g. Bennett and Segerberg 2011
e.g. Tufekci and Wilson 2012
e.g. Gleason 2013
e.g. Leong et al. 2015
e.g Selander and Jarvenpaa 2016
e.g. Weisskircher 2019
e.g. Longstaff 2017
e.g. Casas-Cortés, Osterweil, and
Powell 2008
e.g. Gleasure 2015; Ingram
Bogusz, Teigland, and Vaast 2019
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Supporters of a social movement are more likely to
mobilize around an issue where there are existing,
familiar, organizational structures and familiar forms of
protest, or action repertoires [16]. OS repertoires are
well-established when it comes to software and
hardware projects. However, to our knowledge, such a
project has never formed the basis for a deliberate and
organized social movement, even if they have indirectly
shaped societies. Coordinating mechanisms in OS have
come to be well-recognized and, within their
communities, legitimate [33].
Open source software projects are often described
not only as the most successful examples of online
collaboration [41]–[43], but fast collaboration [44] by
distributed and self-motivated groups [45], [46].
Crucially, these efforts are not only open and

collaborative—but voluntary, implying that economic
incentives are seldom behind OS collaborations [44],
[46]. The exception to this is the increased involvement
of corporate actors in OS projects [47], and the
emergence of so-called “open entrepreneurs” who
commercialize additions to OS code or build spin-outs
[48], [49].
Among the most established of these repertoires are
coordination through developer mailing lists [20], [47]
forum discussions [50], code sharing [51], and code
forking [52], [53]. In Table 2, we give descriptions of
these repertoires in extant literature, describe their aims
and typical outcomes, and give exemplar references.
Having presented the theoretical background to our
study, we turn now to presenting our case and findings.

Table 2. Summary of extant OS Action Repertoires
OS Action
Repertoire
Developer
mailing list
discussion

Public forum
discussions

Code Sharing

Description
Developer-specific
records of areas of
concern and
development within
the project
Areas for public
discussion of an OS
project. Typically
includes developers,
but also users who
are not developers
Computer code
shared, often through
a public repository
like GitHub, typically
with an OS licence in
place

Intention

Outcome

Exemplar
references

To connect
developers with
interest, and often
active, in a project

Bug management, record of
version control, and
developer issue discussion

e.g. Lindberg et al.,
2016; Shaikh &
Vaast, 2016; West &
O’Mahony, 2008

Public discussion
forum for interaction
between developers,
users, and other
interested actors

Overlap with developer
mailing lists, but with
considerable content from
non-developers (e.g. user
issues, requests for advice,
etc)

e.g. Dahlander &
Magnusson, 2008;
Demil & Lecocq,
2006; Ingram Bogusz
& Morisse, 2018

To enable the reuse
of OS code

OS code is shared and
reused, both by OS and nonOS projects (although the
latter is controversial)

Code Forking

Computer code
repurposed, often
(but not always)
through a public
repository

To enable the reuse
and repurposing of
code in new projects,
whether with or
without sanction of
the original project

Code /
Feature
Additions

Addition of new
features, for instance
a new work package
or user interface

New code modules
are built upon the
original project,
adding new
functionality

3. Case and Research Design
Interest in the Blockchain in recent years has largely
centered on how fast it has grown in value—from
around 30 (US) cents per Bitcoin in January 2011, to
around over 9000 USD in July 2020, with a peak of
nearly 20 000 USD per bitcoin in late 2017. At the same

OS code is re-used, creating
new versions of a project,
for instance when there is a
disagreement between
developers or in the interest
of a hobby
Additions to the OS code,
typically reliant on either
the original OS code or a
forked version. These may
be free or paid-for additions
(open entrepreneurship)

e.g. Bergquist &
Ljungberg, 2001;
Dahlander &
Magnusson, 2008;
Hemetsberger &
Reinhardt, 2009
e.g. Andersen &
Ingram Bogusz,
2019; Fleming &
Waguespack, 2007;
Nyman & Lindman,
2013
e.g. Dempsey et al.,
2002;
Krishnamurthy,
2002; Yetis-Larsson
et al., 2015

time, the underlying Blockchain technology has been
appropriated by Organisations and governments to build
new systems, for instance R3-Corda by banks and
TradeLens by Maersk and IBM to track shipping supply
chains. While second and third generations of the
technology are often centrally controlled, the original
Bitcoin Blockchain was not.
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The fact that the original Bitcoin blockchain was
not centrally controlled is important to understanding
why it emerged. This decentralized design, and with it a
correlation between control and interest in the system
was thought to be a way to protect the users of the
system [53].
In our case, a tension emerged between the original
intentions of those who built the system, namely, to keep
it fully decentralized, and the realization that this
decentralization was ineffective and prevented the
system from evolving to meet increased use and
demand.

4. Data collection and analysis
We collected conversation threads from the Bitcoin
Discussion section of the online forum bitcointalk.org.
Bitcointalk.org is a forum dedicated to discussions
around Bitcoin, primarily in English. It is among the
most prominent forums used by Blockchain enthusiasts.
However, unlike mainstream forums like Reddit.com, it
is often used specifically by Blockchain professionals
meaning that interactions on Bitcointalk.org are
particularly linked to the development of the Bitcoin
community and the underlying Blockchain.
Furthermore, the Bitcoin Discussion section contains
threads that are both general and specific in nature; for
instance, threads around the technicalities of the
Blockchain and mining as well as discussions of the
ideological underpinnings of the community.
The data consists of 314 551 digital trace records
covering 13 032 conversation threads in the period from

October 2010 to September 2015. This period was
selected because it contains at least five salient events in
which the Blockchain community was forced to
mobilize including the Harakury fraud incident, the
hacking and theft from the bitcoin exchange Mt.Gox,
the introduction of bitcoin as a digital currency, the
splitting of the community over block size, and the
introduction of credit, merchant, and sidechain additions
to the Blockchain infrastructure.
Our starting point was to treat the forum data as
representing interests of those using/maintaining
Bitcoin and underlying infrastructure. We used
computational methods to cluster the most common
search terms, which we then coded manually to identify
key topics of discussion. We triangulated the
importance of these topics against our own knowledge
and media archives [63].
We conducted a qualitative-computational analysis
of the collected digital trace records of interactions
among members of the Bitcoin community. Data
analysis was conducted in three steps: First, we applied
the term frequency based topic modelling algorithm [61]
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [62] to generate
descriptive coding of observed interactions that identify
the use of OS repertoires in the Blockchain community.
The second step was to parse these descriptive
clusters and classify them, identifying distinct
discussions of OS repertoires in the data, analogous to
what is done in purely manual coding [53]. The third
step involved linking the emerging OS repertoires to
extant theory. These steps, and the methods used, are
summarised in Table 3.

Table 3. Overview of Analysis and Methods
Analytical technique
Analytical outcome
Topic modelling using Latent
Identified 45 issues mediated by OS
1. Initial coding for OS repertoire use
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)
repertoires
Analytical step

2. Axial coding for distinct OS
repertoire discussion and use

Manual coding of topic clusters
resulting from the topic model

Explication of five OS repertoires and
instantiation of 11 sub-repertoires

3. Theoretical coding

Theoretical coding of the data to
unpack OS repertoire use

Explanation of the effect of OS
repertoire use on the social
movement

5. Findings
We turn now to unpacking the OS repertoires that we
see in the Blockchain movement (summarized in Table
4). Overall, we find that OS repertoires allow not only
for coordination and shared-problem solving, consistent
with extant OS research, but also that OS repertoires
create incentives for individual-level activities that
advance the goals of the larger movement, particularly

through mobilization and by mollifying dissent by
providing a space for ventilation.

5.1. Developer mailing list and public
forum discussions
Public forums provided for the repertoires of consensusbuilding and for community members to express their
frustrations, or what we call ventilation. Consensus-
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building was visible in how community members
discussed concerns around country-level regulations, as
well as how to respond to corruption within the
Blockchain community. Sometimes this consensusbuilding was unsuccessful, with the conversations
ending without consensus, as in the case of how to
respond to dominant players, for instance miners in
China:
It looks grim for BTC without China in the picture
and you might say we don't need China other countries
will acknowledge it and there will be mass adoption but
look at the value of BTC now without China in the
picture. China obviously is a big player and I can't see
BTC hitting a new milestone or even hitting the peak of
$1,300 BTC but I hope I am wrong. What do you think?”
(December 18, 2013, 10:54:17 AM)
At the same time, individuals used the space to
ventilate, without the intention of building consensus, as
happened during the bankruptcy of a sizeable Bitcoin
exchange called Mt.Gox:
“…looks like green adresses are failing , theese
things are non confirmation adresses , witch should be
protected by MTGOX.... because the bitcoin network did
not confrm yet , BITSTAMP does not seem to have this
problem , NOR does BTC china!so it is NOT a general
bitcoin problem.but a gox green adress problem.so
THIS IS A GOX ONLY PROBLEM! , not bitcoin! if it
was a general btc error Bitstamp would have had the
same problem and so would have BTC china!”
(February 10, 2014, 10:50:20 AM)

5.2. Code Sharing and Debugging
Delving into the activities performed by developers (in
consultation with the wider community, our analysis
pointed to how Code Sharing and Debugging were used
in practice. This repertoire, drawing on common OS
practices, saw developers coordinate with one another
and community members (sub-repertoire developer
coordination) around code streamlining, maintenance
and minor improvements. We observed two significant
instances where this occurred, namely in discussions
around how efficient Bitcoin was compared to other
Blockchains, and how to respond to Bitcoin’s perceived
inefficiencies, particularly difficulties scaling to reach
rising demand:
“By default Bitcoin will not created blocks larger
than 250kb even though it could do so without a hard
fork. We have now reached this limit. Transactions are

stacking up in the memory pool and not getting cleared
fast enough.
What this means is, you need to take a decision and
do one of these things:
• Start your node with the -blockmaxsize flag set
to something higher than 250kb, for example blockmaxsize=1023000. This will mean you
create larger blocks that confirm more
transactions. You can also adjust the size of the
area in your blocks that is reserved for free
transactions with the -blockprioritysize flag.
• Change your nodes code to de-prioritize or
ignore transactions you don't care about, for
example, Luke-Jr excludes SatoshiDice
transactions which makes way for other users.
• Do nothing.
If everyone does nothing, then people will start
having to attach higher and higher fees to get into
blocks until Bitcoin fees end up being uncompetitive
with competing services like PayPal.” (March 06, 2013,
09:44:20 AM)
Of note is the fact that there is a connection between
developer coordination and later code-level changes in
response to that coordination. In other words, there was
overlap between the repertoire of developer
coordination and Feature Additions and Code Forking.
However, while developer coordination allowed
the movement to advance when it came to maintenance
issues both code sharing and debugging and hardware
debugging facilitated improvement in user, rather than
code, experience, by making sure that existing functions
worked as they should—and finding and remedying
errors and incompatibilities where they occurred.

5.3. Code and Feature Additions
Code-level changes which did not amount to minor
instances of streamlining or maintenance done through
developer coordination instead amounted to Code and
Feature Additions, or a repertoire through which
individuals could rely on the underlying movement to
build something that they could commercialize. There
were many instances of this through entrepreneurial
diversification, or what has elsewhere been called open
entrepreneurship [48], [49]. Some of this diversification
responded to market concerns from the community,
while other instances focused on making the
community, and thus the movement, more relevant for
outsiders:
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Table 4. How OS repertoires mediate mobilisation, characteristics, instances, and impact
Enabled
OS Action
mobilisation
Impact on
Characteristics
Examples
Repertoire
through submovement
repertoires of
Boycotting of Bitcoin XT
Apparent consensus
Forum discussion over
ConsensusResponse to regulations
on how to respond to
two or more periods
building
perceived social and
Response to perceived
without diverging
corruption of Bitcoin.org technical threats
Developer
Attitude (and possible
Forum discussion
mailing list
response to) dominance
Failure of community
Unsuccessful
terminates after one
and public
of Chinese miners
to agree on response
consensusperiod, never translates
forum
to perceived social
Attitude (and possible
building
into concrete code-based
discussions
and technical threats
response to) Bitcoin
proposal
scams
Self-contained hub of
Short-term response
Response to Mt.Gox
Ventilation
discussion, without
prompted by external
bankruptcy
consensus or response
events
Discussion over two or
Coordination around
more periods without
improving on existing
Comparison with
Developer
diverging, spans both
applications of code,
alternatives to Bitcoin
coordination
forums and developer
in line with social and
(e.g. Ether)
mailing lists (links to dev
practical
Code Sharing
posts in forum data)
considerations
and
Reference to pieces of
Shared Code
Support from other
Debugging
Code Sharing and
code in trying to remedy
community members
Debugging
UI output
errors/bugs
in keeping the
technical elements of
Seeking support for
Hardware
the social movement
hardware problems that
Hardware failure
debugging
running
affect code operations
Merchant applications
Innovation within
Realised addition to
technology, making
Consumer applications
underlying code base,
use of code, that:
Online
Payments
separate applications
Realised (open)
1) Keeps the social
Investment
visible in discussion and
entrepreneurship
movement
verified through
Code /
relevant, or
triangulation with other
Feature
Currency hedging
Facilitates increased
sources
Additions
mobilisation
Proposed but unrealised
May lead to code fork
Unrealised
addition to underlying
Giving credit
to enable unrealized
entrepreneurship code (verified through
addition
triangulation)
4mb block size change
Split to the technology
in the name of
2mb block size change
Concrete code-based
unresolved ideological
Sub-optimality
proposals to change or
differences, typically
correction
add to existing code after
leads users to leave
Bitcoin Core
community consensus
the original
movement
Concrete code-based
BitcoinXT
Code Forking
proposals that change
Ideological pivots existing code after
Technical
Alternative Blockchains
community consensus,
implementation of
typically controversial
code that creates new
communities, and may
Concrete code-based
both new and existing
proposals necessitate a
New Blockchains with
movement members
Spin-offs
new project, with or
different characteristics,
without consensus,
notably Ethereum
typically controversial
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“…We would like to hear from the community what
are the most annoying\frustrating stuff you have with
Bitcoin and would love to get a solution for ?Feel free
to talk about any problem, even if it seems unsolvable or
too abstract (e.g. Bitcoin is not safe enough for the
average user) Edit:After reading all the replies, I feel
confident summarizing that the #1 problem of Bitcoin is
probably lack of adoption. And the main reasons of lack
of adoption are probably ease of use and insufficient
security. We are a team of entrepreneurs and software
developers that are going to spend the next following
months-year on developing a new product.One of the
most appealing markets for us is the Bitcoin market.We
will try to learn us much as possible from your replies
and try to tackle the problems head on” (June 27, 2015,
03:19:37 AM)
Many of these additions were hard to implement as
they would require changes to the character of the
community, and systemic changes to the code—not just
reliance on the existing code, as in the case of a credit
feature addition:
“If there's no backstop such as the one which
central banks provided in 2008, you could potentially
see a rapid contraction of credit down to zero and
complete collapse of the entire system as everyone tries
to exchange their credit for something tangible.”
(December 28, 2012, 02:34:03 PM)
These failed attempts at adding features instead led
to code forking.

5.4. Code Forking
It is well-known that participants in OS software
projects disagree, whether on what to do, or how to do
it [44]. This is true of the Blockchain social movement
too. When attempts at developer coordination or
community consensus-building fails, members of the
social movement repurpose the existing code in new
projects [52], [53]. In this case, code forking as a
repertoire occurs as one of three sub-repertoires.
First, sub-optimality correction refers to dramatic
changes to the underlying code ([53]), in the name of
improving the existing movement. In other words, those
who engage in sub-optimality correction do so in the
name of supporting and making the social movement
more relevant:
“Sometimes bottleneck happening,too muchunconfirmed transaction when the blocksize only limited
for 1mb,and it'll affect on your transaction,need to wait
longer than usual and sometimes it'd took time about 1
hour or more,it's sure a problem i guess, i'm sure you
don't want to wait about ~1hour when your client is
waiting for the transaction. I can catch up your point
dude, you are absolutely right that sometimes the
transaction of bitcoin have been delaying even troubled.

But i hoe that problem will fix by developers of bitcoin .
" (May 27, 2016, 11:15:24 AM)
In contrast, ideological pivots are not about
improving on the existing movement, but rather making
the movement relevant by expanding it to new user
groups. In the process, existing users may leave—or
remain members of the original project while also
supporting a new project. Typically, the disagreements
here are of an ideological character—with practical
implications. The typical case is that of Bitcoin XT: as
a result of increased use, the Bitcoin blockchain had
slowed due to increased demand. One proposed solution
was to increase the size of each block, from 1mb to 4mb.
This would reduce the number of miners able to run the
software (owing to issues around processing power),
centralizing control of the blockchain, but would
increase the Blockchain’s transaction handling capacity
in a new version of the blockchain known as BitcoinXT.
This centralization was an ideological issue in the
community as it was described as making the movement
less democratic, hence the ideological split.
Lastly, Spin-offs occurred when users or developers
decided to start a new project for reasons that were
largely unrelated to the perceived effectiveness of the
existing blockchain, but rather around its capabilities or
scope. In other words, they wished to be able to do more
with the underlying technology than the existing
movement allowed for.
Having discussed how OS repertoires manifested in
the social movement of Blockchain (table 4), we turn
now to discussing the implications of these findings for
our understandings of digital social movements, and the
interplay between OS and a social movement.

6. Discussion: OS action repertoires
6.1. OS Repertoires for Coordination
Within both software e.g. [64], [65] and music
production [24], OS movements have re-shaped
competition dynamics and business models and made
products free and accessible online—thus closing digital
divides across the globe. In this paper, we not only
highlight that OS repertoires provide familiar
organizational structures and actions for coordination
and activity [16], but also unpack how these OS
repertoires are employed to mobilize in the social
movement of the Blockchain.
We thus link the use of Blockchain mobilization
activities to existing, familiar, OS repertoires. These
Blockchain-specific uses of OS repertoires allow for
mobilization in the social movement of Blockchain
through developer coordination, code sharing and
debugging, and hardware debugging. Further, OS
forums are a context in which developers and movement
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participants can build consensus or just vent, providing
not only a way to coordinate, but also ways for
individuals to let off steam without undermining the
larger movement.
Where this coordination fails, further OS
repertoires help to hitch subsequent projects to the
parent project through sub-optimality correction,
ideological pivots and spin-offs, collectively referred to
as part of the Code Forking repertoire.
Interestingly, the possibility to build upon the
system through Feature Additions channels individuals
to scope the system, making it both more relevant and
more influential.

projects lead to entrepreneurship [48]. In this case, this
entrepreneurial drive led to feature addition, which kept
the social movement relevant and even made it more
appealing to would-be participants. This entrepreneurial
drive also leads to the creation of new projects through
ideological pivoting and spin-offs.
We submit that this harnessing of economic
incentives within a digital social movement makes
Blockchain not just a novel digital social movement that
responds to a perceived economic failure, but rather an
economic social movement—in which economic
incentives mobilise and drive the movement itself,
keeping it relevant, allowing it to scope, and mobilising
new movement participants.

6.2. (Open) Entrepreneurship mobilises

7. Conclusion
As highlighted earlier, there is a tension between
the openness of OS projects, which both attracts
resources and knowledge [20] and drains them [21]. We
see evidence of this in the social movement of
Blockchain, albeit with largely positive outcomes,
largely because the knowledge here is non-severable;
reuse and repurposing of code need not detract from the
original project—and users and developers can be
involved in multiple projects if they so wish.
While it could have been the case that the activities
of individual entrepreneurs would undermine the
original project [22], [66], what we saw instead was that
the use of OS repertoires allowed for coordination, when
needed, avenues in which to vent frustration, and
avenues to productively harness differences of
(political) opinion, including ideological differences, in
the form of code.
Thus, the use of open entrepreneurship serves not
just the individuals who benefit economically from it,
but the social movement as a whole. Not only does open
entrepreneurship support the movement’s pursuit of
influence and relevance [29], [30], it facilitates the
inward flow of resources by attracting new users and
supporters, and even outside capital [31]. Lastly, it
resolves collective action problems by creating
economic incentives for action at an individual level that
support the movement at the collective level [32].

6.3. Digital Economic Social Movement
The Blockchain social movement responded to
perceived weaknesses in existing economic institutions.
However, they not only offered alternative economic
views of the world [67], [68], they built an entire
alternative system in the form of code.
In so doing, participants relied on existing
repertoires known from OS projects to coordinate and
fine-tune the movement. Crucially, these repertoires
also highlighted how economic incentives in OS

Overall, we find that the tension between mobilization
and fragmentation is a driving mechanism that promotes
mobilization and, with it, relevance and influence, in the
economic social movement of Blockchain. Specifically,
this mechanism operates through individual-level
activities as participants in the social movement of
Blockchain not only make use of pre-existing OS
repertoires to coordinate, ventilate and build consensus
around issues, but that the use of these repertoires helps
to keep the movement relevant.
We further find that while the openness of a social
movement based on OS principles may lead to a lack of
control, what occurred in this case was that openness
encouraged open entrepreneurship—mobilizing further
in the name of the social movement.
Lastly, the use of entrepreneurship and the implied
economic incentives that come with it suggest that
Blockchain is not just a social movement in response to
the perceived failings of the economic system, but a
social movement with an economic character of its own,
making it an economic social movement.
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